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                               FOREWORD
            Recent economic literature strongly suggests that
     outward-oriented economies with sound trade, investment, and
     export systems have achieved better development results than
     have inward-oriented economies.  The Agency for International
     Development (A.I.D.) has devoted substantial resources to
     supporting outward-oriented growth through projects focused on
     export and investment promotion.  Two key questions face
     donors:  Is export and investment promotion assistance
     worthwhile?  Does it merit continued A.I.D. support?
            The Center for Development Information and Evaluation
     (CDIE) has conducted a worldwide assessment of A.I.D.'s
     experience with export and investment promotion services to
     evaluate the contribution of intermediaries providing services to
     exporters in developing countries.  Such services include those
     provided directly to exporters or investors: information (e.g.,
     foreign markets), contact-making (e.g., with buyers), deal-making,
     technical assistance, and government facilitation.
     Issues analyzed include the rationale for donor intervention; the
     impact on exports, jobs, and the market for support services; the
     return on A.I.D.'s investment; service strategies; and effective
     service providers.   This analysis has been based on surveys of
     exporters in seven countries, extensive interviews with service
     providers, and other sources.
            The CDIE assessment focused initially on export and
     investment promotion projects in the Latin America and the
     Caribbean (LAC) region.  A desk review examining 15 projects
     resulted in a report, Promoting Trade and Investment in
     Constrained Environments: A.I.D. Experience in Latin America
     and the Caribbean, A.I.D. Evaluation Special Study No. 69.
     CDIE followed this study with field visits to Guatemala, the
     Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, and Chile, culminating in a
     synthesis report, Export and Investment Promotion:
     Sustainability and Effective Service Delivery, A.I.D. Program
     and Operations Assessment Report No. 2.   In 1991, CDIE
     initiated fieldwork in Asia, examining programs in India,
     Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand.  This report is one of four
     country studies produced for the Asia phase of the assessment.
     To complement these country studies, CDIE completed two
     cross-cutting technical reports, "Service Use and Impact:
     Evidence From Survey of Exporters in Asia," and "Measuring
     the Costs and Benefits of Export Promotion Projects."  In
     addition, CDIE carried out a desk review of similar projects in
     the Near East Region resulting in the report, "A Review of
     A.I.D. Experience: Export and Investment Promotion in Egypt
     and Morocco."  The forthcoming program assessment report,
     "Export and Investment Promotion Services: Do They Make A
     Difference?" will draw on each of these technical reports in
     presenting key findings, conclusions, and management
     implications of this assessment.
                            SUMMARY
            The benefits of an outward-oriented trade strategy have
     been convincingly demonstrated, but it remains less clear
     whether export success depends only on getting incentives right
     or whether production and marketing assistance to nascent
     exporters of manufactures is also important.  To clarify the
     impact of publicly provided export services on export
     performance, this report offers a detailed case study of the
     Republic of Korea's public sector export services program
     during Korea's early export expansion period (1961 to 1973).
     Korea was chosen for study because, first, its export services
     assistance, in tandem with a lucrative export incentive system,
     provided an ideal opportunity for considering these issues; and
     second, the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.)
     provided substantial assistance to the Government of Korea in
     support of its export services program during this period.
            Although the Korean Government experimented with
     several export promotion approaches during the late 1950s and
     early 1960s, key aspects of Korea's comprehensive export
     system were not in place until 1965.  At that point, the
     Government began to maintain macroeconomic stability and a
     competitive exchange rate; set quantitative export targets by
     firm, industry, and geographic market; and monitored
     performance relative to targets, rewarding firms that met or
     exceeded targets with heavily subsidized credit.
            At the same time, the Government created a high-level
     Export Development Committee (EDC) to provide production
     and marketing assistance to exporters.  Recognizing, however,
     that  production and marketing are highly specialized, the
     Government created a large number of joint publicþprivate
     commodity-specific task forces to resolve these problems.  It
     also created two public sector, industrywide institutions that set
     industrial standards, promoted quality control, and inspected and
     tested the quality of Korea's exports.  The Korea Trade
     Promotion Agency (KOTRA), a public sector agency, was
     created in 1962 to market Korean exports.  KOTRA carried out
     market research, engaged in a public relations program, and
     searched for buyers.  Because the Government feared private
     sector dependence on imported technology, it created the
     Korean Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) in 1966.
     KIST was responsible for developing an indigenous capacity to
     generate new industrial technologies.  A.I.D. provided assistance
     directly to a number of these public sector institutions and
     supplemented this support with highly targeted production
     assistance to firms and industries.
            How successful were these public sector agencies in
     fulfilling their mandates?  Interviews of exporters from the
     1970s, along with more recent interviews of exporters and
     former Government officials involved in the early stages of
     export expansion, suggest that the Government's public sector
     export services institutions had minimal impact on export
     expansion.  It appears that lucrative export incentives and a
     substantial entrepreneurial history facilitated mutual searches
     between Korean exporters and aggressive foreign importers,
     buyers, and machinery suppliers.  As a result, foreign sources
     provided most of the production and marketing assistance used
     by exporters.
     What can donors learn from this experience?
            First, donors need to carefully identify the rationale for
     intervening in export service markets.  The statist orientation of
     Korea's export promotion program and public sector distrust of
     the private sector led the Government and A.I.D. to assume that
     intervention in export services markets was warranted.  This
     was a mistaken assumption.  Government and A.I.D. officials
     underestimated the experience of Koreans in industry and
     exporting during the period of Japanese colonialism.  They
     incorrectly assumed a limited capacity by Koreans to respond
     to shifts in the incentive structure, and underestimated the
     technical, managerial, and foreign trade skills of Korean
     entrepreneurs.  The history of substantial technical assistance
     from Japanese, German, British, and Australian firms, from
     post-independence to pre-1960, was ignored.  The role of
     Japanese trading companies and importers/buyers in export
     marketing was also underestimated. In short, there was no
     significant market failure in export services markets.
            Second, it may be difficult to make public sector
     provision of export services effective.  A.I.D.'s massive
     macroeconomic policy reform assistance was important in
     laying the foundation for export-led growth.  In addition,
     Korea's lucrative export incentives provided the ideal
     opportunity to test the effectiveness of a strategy of public
     sector provision of export services.  If those services had helped
     firms overcome marketing and production problems, it would
     have been demonstrated that publicly provided services, offered
     in tandem with the right incentive structure, could propel export
     growth.  However, because the public sector export services
     appear to have made only a marginal contribution to Korean
     export growth, the effectiveness of such services in other
     countries may be open to question.
            Third, export services provided by the international
     private sector made a difference.  Korea's exporters used
     production and marketing assistance.  Until they established
     their own overseas offices or used domestic trading companies,
     Korean exporters relied heavily on Japanese trading companies
     and machinery suppliers for production technology.  Given the
     extensive production and marketing contacts that developed
     between Korean exporters and foreign export services providers,
     it is likely that those services had a significant impact on export
     expansion.  This suggests that public sector production and
     marketing assistance might be most effective in helping
     exporters develop long-term collaborative relationships with
     importers/buyers and foreign machinery suppliers of developed
     countries.
            Finally, public sector institutions should not be created
     to provide export services, even if there is a rationale for
     subsidizing export services support.  Each of Korea's public
     sector export services institutions has experienced significant
     sustainability problems, including loss of initial mission,
     sagging morale, and difficulty finding a new mission.  Limited
     and time-bound public support for private sector exporters could
     have occurred without creating and subsidizing several
     ineffective public sector institutions that continued indefinitely.
     Because it is often difficult to reform or close existing
     government institutions, the decision to adopt a strategy to
     provide public sector export services should not be taken
     lightly.
                           GLOSSARY
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                      1.  INTRODUCTION
            The purpose of this report is to examine the role of
     export services assistance to Korean manufacturers in the early
     stages (1961 to 1973) of Korea's export drive.  Because this
     assistance was deeply intertwined with the A.I.D. assistance
     program, its examination must consider the role of A.I.D.  This
     report will determine where export services assistance fit in the
     Korean Government's and A.I.D.'s overall export strategy, how
     services were delivered, and whether export services had a
     positive impact on exports.
            It is not yet clear whether Korea's export success was
     simply the result of getting incentives right or whether
     production and marketing assistance to nascent exporters of
     manufactures mattered.  Because Korea's outward-oriented
     policies followed a period of import-substitution
     industrialization, exporters had to organize for many new and
     unfamiliar tasks simultaneously when the policy framework
     shifted.  If market failure kept the private sector from
     responding to those problems, publicly provided or supported
     export services might have been necessary to assist new
     exporters with the marketing and production challenges called
     for by the shift in incentives.
            Although the Government's export services assistance
     may have compensated for market failure, little is known about
     it.  Evidence suggests that public sector export services
     assistance, especially that provided by trade promotion
     organizations, has not been effective.  But this does not mean
     that export services has had no effect.  A.I.D.'s experience in
     Latin America suggests that export services, provided by highly
     specialized private sector institutions, can make a difference.
     Moreover, several studies have shown that multinational
     corporations, multinational buying groups, and
     importers/wholesalers assisted export manufacturers in East
     Asia under international subcontracting arrangements.
     Importers and buyers also provided design, styling, and
     technical specifications, and they monitored quality control.
            If indigenous entrepreneurs or the international private
     sector provided these services during the early stages of Korea's
     export expansion, there may have been little need for public
     sector support or provision of production and marketing
     assistance to nascent exporters.  But because little is known
     about the relative importance and effectiveness of these
     different service providers, this examination of the Korean
     Government's export services program must consider the roles
     of indigenous entrepreneurs and the international private sector
     in export services markets.
            The analysis proceeds in four parts.  Section 2 outlines
     the political and economic context of the Korean Government's
     export services support to exporters of manufactures, and U.S.
     assistance in this regard.  Section 3 examines the market for
     export services, reviewing evidence on the capacity of Korean
     entrepreneurs and the foreign private sector to meet the export
     services needs of manufacturing exporters.  Section 4 reviews
     evidence on the sources of export services used by Korean
     exporters of manufactures, and Section 5 draws implications
     from Korea's experience for donor support in export services
     markets.
               2.  THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT
            Korea's modern industrial and trade policy history can
     be roughly divided into four phases: (1) an import-substitution
     phase prior to 1961; (2) a take-off phase that began in 1961 and
     lasted through 1973; (3) a heavy chemical industry drive that
     occurred between 1973 and 1979; and (4) a post-1979
     liberalization phase.  Figures 1 and 2 provide an overview of
     Korea's export performance during this period.  Policy during
     Phase 2, or the take-off phase, is notable for macroeconomic
     stabilization, devaluation, and a unique administrative system of
     promoting exports within the context of limited trade
     liberalization and classical import protection.  Starting in 1973,
     general export promotion gave way to a sectoral development
     strategy that focused on heavy and chemical industries.  The
     major policy innovation during Phase 3 was the administrative
     system's shift from favoring all exporters to promoting heavy
     and chemical industries.  Import protection, fiscal preferences,
     and the allocation of credit were all used to build world-class
     industries in automobiles, consumer electronics, shipbuilding,
     and steel. Following structural and macroeconomic imbalances
     created by the second oil price shock, the first post-Park
     Government embarked on a neoclassical-style liberalization
     program.  The exchange rate was devalued; the selective
     allocation of credit to heavy and chemical industries was slowed
     and then stopped; credit subsidies were reduced; and the trade
     regime was liberalized by relaxing import controls and reducing
     tariffs.
            Since the need for export services would likely have
     been greatest during the Phase 2 (1961 to 1973), the discussion
     that follows focuses on that period.  Although this should
     permit illumination of the role of export services assistance
     during the early stage of export expansion, subsequent shifts in
     the policy framework that occurred should demonstrate that (1)
     strategies put in place are rarely permanent and (2) what may
     have made good sense for one period may not make sense for
     another.
            The turning point in the take-off phase of South Korea's
     export-led industrialization program began with public outrage
     over the illicit accumulation of wealth, which swept the Rhee
     Government from office in 1961.  The military's seizure of
     power was accompanied by a ban on political parties,
     restrictions on the press, and a disbanding of unions.  During
     the ensuing campaign against illicit wealth accumulation, the
     Government increased its tax on the private sector and
     nationalized the banking system, which led to unprecedented
     control over the allocation of credit.  The crisis and resulting
     consolidation of political power gave President Park a unique
     opportunity to reform the bureaucracy and alter the relationship
     between government and business.
            President Park began administrative and economic
     reforms that transformed the Korean economy.
     Administratively, the president's office created two economic
     secretariats, and an Economic Planning Board (EPB) of
     reformist technocrats.  The creation of the two secretariats
     signaled the president's intention to take economic matters
     seriously, and the creation of the EPB fostered the emergence
     of a powerful institution.  The EPB was given responsibility
     for planning, budgeting, investment appraisal, price policies, and
     the gathering and dissemination of statistics.  The EPB
     chairman was made deputy prime minister, a status that
     afforded him substantial authority over other ministries.  This
     development, combined with President Park's unwavering
     commitment to rapid economic development, set the stage for
     Korea's highly statist transition to export-led industrialization.
            But the centralization of decision-making authority did
     not constitute a coherent strategy.  Strategy formulation required
     pressure from A.I.D.  During the early transition stage A.I.D.
     was concerned with macroeconomic stabilization and stagnating
     exports.  Because U.S. assistance to Korea was so massive, the
     A.I.D. Mission was able to exert substantial influence on
     Korean policymakers concerning these issues.  When A.I.D.
     threatened to suspend aid disbursements over macroeconomic
     policy disagreements, the Government negotiated a stabilization
     program.  There were major devaluations in 1961 and 1964.
     Because domestic inflation eroded the impact of these nominal
     devaluations, in 1964 the Government inaugurated a sliding peg
     exchange rate system.  In addition, the Government
     experimented with several selective export promotion devices.
     A highly discretionary system of multiple exchange rates, direct
     cash payments, and permission to retain foreign exchange
     earnings were gradually replaced by more automatic and
     significant concessions, including subsidized loans, tax
     reductions on income from exports, exemption of exports and
     intermediate inputs used in exports from indirect taxes,
     accelerated depreciation for export investment, and a wastage
     allowance system which allowed exporters to import
     preferentially more intermediate inputs than needed for their
     exports.
            By early 1965 the key aspects of Korea's Phase 2 (1961
     to 1973) export administration were in place.  The Government
     began maintaining macroeconomic stability and a competitive
     exchange rate.  It also began setting quantitative export
     targets by firm, industry, and geographic market and
     monitored performance relative to targets, rewarding those who
     met or exceeded targets with heavily subsidized credit.   This
     multifaceted export administration was harnessed to a mobilized
     publicþprivate sector effort that focused on results.
     Interestingly enough, this phase did not involve significant
     liberalization of imports.  Prior to 1967, most commodities
     could not be imported into Korea (except for direct or indirect
     export), unless those imports could be shown not to compete
     with local products.
            Along with these developments, the joint
     Korean/American Economic Cooperation Council (ECC) created
     the Export Promotion Subcommittee (EPSC) of ECC to deal
     with production, administrative, and marketing problems facing
     exporters.  Both the Government of Korea and A.I.D.
     representatives on EPSC assumed that Korea's potential for
     industrial and export development was severely constrained by
     problems in these areas.  The Government believed that it
     would have to prime the pump if exporters were to succeed.
     Despite Korean  and American differences over how much to
     lend to the private sector, both sides recognized that production
     assistance was highly specialized, which called for a
     commodity-by-commodity assistance strategy.  This led the
     Government to create a number of joint public, private sector,
     commodity-specific working task forces (WTFs) to resolve
     production problems in specific firms and industries.  A.I.D.
     financed numerous, highly targeted consultants to work with
     individual firms and industries.  This assistance went to
     producers of human hair wigs, ceramics, silk cloth, furniture,
     canned goods, antiques, men's garments, footwear, paper,
     cement, shrimp, and embroidered handkerchiefs.
            This highly targeted production assistance to particular
     firms and industries was complemented by a Korean-American
     effort to address industrywide technology, marketing, and
     quality control problems.  A.I.D. supported new public sector
     institutions to develop and transfer technology, such as the
     Korean Institute of Science and Technology (KIST), and to
     improve the quality of Korean exports, the National Industrial
     Research Institute (NIRI).  It also strengthened the new public
     sector export marketing institution, the Korean Trade Promotion
     Association (KOTRA).
            KIST was a product of the Government's perception of
     the private sector's weak capacity in applied industrial research
     and high dependence on imported technology.  KIST was
     charged with developing an indigenous capacity to generate new
     industrial technologies that could meet the needs of private
     industry.  It also assisted the Government in regulating
     technology imports.  To ensure that KIST focused on the needs
     of industry, its research agenda was tied to contract research for
     private industry.
            The creation of a public sector source of assistance in
     applied industrial technology across all industries, considered
     important to Korea's development, was recognized to be a
     massive task.  Since the Korean scientific community did not
     have the capacity to organize and manage such an effort, the
     Korean Government and A.I.D. turned to the Battelle Memorial
     Institute for assistance.  Battelle helped KIST develop links to
     the international science community, recruit trained senior staff,
     plan physical facilities, and identify research projects.  Once
     established, KIST systematically surveyed the industrial sector's
     need for new technology and then carried out numerous
     research projects.
            KOTRA was established in 1962 to provide
     industrywide export marketing.  KOTRA was responsible for
     conducting market research (e.g., identifying Korea's
     competitors and the price and quality of their goods), exploring
     foreign demand for Korean goods, promoting Korean exports
     through public relations, and finding buyers.  KOTRA also
     provided information for Korea's young export manufacturers,
     monitored buyer response to Korean products, and collected
     copies of world-famous brand goods for display to Korean
     manufacturers.  Because the Government believed in the
     importance of export marketing, the president of KOTRA
     participated regularly in the President's Monthly Export
     Promotion Meetings.
            A.I.D. provided a range of assistance to KOTRA,
     including a survey and assessment of KOTRA, and in the
     development of KOTRA's "school for exports."  A.I.D. also
     arranged for the president of KOTRA to visit the heads of large
     U.S. buying chains in the United States.  This trip was followed
     by a visit to Korea by 10 heads of the largest U.S. retail buying
     chains.
            Quality control issues were addressed through the
     Industrial Standardization Act of 1961, which established the
     Industrial Advancement Administration (IA) under the Ministry
     of Commerce and Industry.  IA created industrial standards (the
     KS, or Korea Standards, mark), promoted quality control in
     industrial production, and was responsible for inspecting and
     testing the quality of Korean exports.  Although IA's mandate
     extended well beyond exports, the Government was convinced
     by Japan's reputation as a low-quality exporter to make a
     concerted effort to ensure the quality of exports.  As a result,
     IA created a special public sector institute, the National
     Industrial Research Institute (NIRI), to carry out export
     inspections and testing.
            A.I.D. supported NIRI by providing two full-time
     specialists and numerous short-term experts.  It used
     technical assistance to provide advice on specifications for
     laboratory equipment and buildings and to set up training
     programs for quality control technicians.  A.I.D. financed a
     review of Korea's quality inspection system for exports.  It
     brought in a full-time quality control adviser to assist in
     establishing a quality control association and organized several
     trips abroad so that Korean technicians could study quality
     control methods used in Hong Kong, Japan, and Taiwan.
     A.I.D. support was also used to establish private sector
     inspection laboratories in the Industrial Area Program centers in
     Taegu and Pusan.
            At A.I.D.'s urging, NIRI built, equipped, and trained
     individuals for six nongovernmental inspection and testing
     institutes.  Initially, these institutes were responsible for
     inspecting all exports.  They charged fees for their services,
     and they were apparently self- supporting.  These quasi
     -public inspection and testing institutes were complemented by
     several private sector inspection and testing organizations.
     NIRI also trained inspectors for private inspection agencies.
            As the previous discussion makes clear, the Korean
     Government's export services assistance was an integral part of
     a wide ranging state-led export promotion program, which
     included restructuring economic and export bureaucracies.
     These bureaucracies maintained macroeconomic stability and a
     competitive exchange rate.  They set quantitative export targets
     by firm, industry, and geographic market.  They monitored
     performance relative to targets and rewarded firm and industry
     level export performance.  This multifaceted export
     administration focused on results.  The statist orientation of
     export promotion, distrust of the private sector, and
     misunderstanding of its capabilities led the Government to rely
     on a public sector services provision assistance strategy.
     Although A.I.D.'s technical assistance advisers were
     occasionally able to nudge services provision in a private sector
     direction, little thought was given to the role that either
     indigenous entrepreneurs or the international private sector
     might play in export services provision.  As discussed in
     Section 5, this limited the effectiveness of the Government's
     export services assistance.
                  3.  THE MARKET FOR EXPORT SERVICES
            Although Korea's public sector assistance in export
     services was targeted to correct market failures in export
     services markets, there was already significant indigenous
     marketing and production capacity in particular private sector
     industries.  That capacity reflected a substantial entrepreneurial
     history and significant production and marketing contacts
     between Korean entrepreneurs and private sector firms in
     several developed countries, most notably Japan.  This
     indigenous entrepreneurial capacity and contacts with foreign
     private sector firms suggest that domestic and international
     private sector actors may have played an important role in
     "filling the gaps" in the export services market.  For this reason,
     it is important to provide some assessment of Korea's
     indigenous entrepreneurial capacity and the relationship between
     Korean entrepreneurs and foreign private sector actors.
            For centuries Koreans lived in extreme international
     isolation, which ended abruptly when the Hermit Kingdom was
     forced to open its ports in 1876.  By 1910, the previous
     centuries' isolation had been replaced by substantial exposure
     to modern industry.  In that year approximately 10 percent of
     the labor force worked in manufacturing and exports, which,
     although virtually nonexistent prior to the opening, already
     constituted nearly 20 percent of the domestic commodity
     product.
            During the Japanese occupation from 1910 to 1945,
     Korea grew fast and industrialized further.  Between 1910 and
     1945, manufacturing net commodity product grew at an annual
     compound growth rate of 10 percent, and net commodity
     product tripled.  As a result, exports reached 30 percent of
     national income.  Although exports were concentrated in
     primary commodities, especially rice, textiles made up more
     than 10 percent of exports, while pulp, paper, pig iron, sugar,
     flour, leather, cement, and ammonium sulfate added another 3
     to 6 percent of exports.
            Korean industrial activity between 1910 and 1945 was
     particularly noteworthy in textiles, an industry that came to
     dominate exports during the first decade of the post-1960 export
     expansion.  Although Japanese firms were dominant, by
     1938 Korean-owned firms held 24 percent (10.2 million yen) of
     the capital invested in large-scale textile firms.   This period
     also gave birth to a small indigenous financial, commercial, and
     industrial elite that evolved into some of Korea's post-1960
     chaebol (industrial conglomerates), which came to dominate the
     Korean economy.  Two cases that follow, those of Kim Yon-su
     and Pyong-ch'ol Yi, typify this pattern.
            The Kim family's wealth dates to extensive agricultural
     holdings from the mid-19th century.  Kim Yon-su, a
     grandson of Kim Yo-hyop, completed his secondary and college
     education in Japan and graduated from Kyoto Imperial
     University in 1921.  He served as managing director and
     president of Kyongsong Spinning and Weaving Company, the
     largest indigenously owned and managed industrial enterprise
     of the colonial period.  With offices in Osaka, Kyongsong had
     an export orientation and was extremely active in Manchuria.
            Kim also organized, managed, and owned Samyang, a
     large indigenous agricultural cooperative and served as the chief
     executive officer of the Haedong Bank.  Other Kim holdings
     included Chung'ang Commerce and Industry, which was
     devoted to marketing and rubber production; three limited
     liability joint stock firms, including South Manchurian
     Spinning; Tonggwang Raw Silk Company; and investments in
     many Japanese enterprises, including a trading company
     (Chosen Tao Trade), a leading utility (Kanko Hydroelectric),
     and a railway company (Keishun Railway Company).  In all,
     Kim held directorships in more than 20 companies with paid in
     capital in excess of 100 million yen.  Other families had
     similarly large holdings in commerce and finance.
            Pyong-ch'ol Yi, the founder of Samsung and the
     youngest son of a wealthy landlord, was born in 1910.  After
     middle school, he enrolled in the Political Science-Economics
     Division at Waseda University in Japan.  He started in business
     in 1936, when he established a rice mill with funds inherited
     from his parents.  By 1945 he had expanded into trucking, real
     estate, domestic trading, milling, noodle-making, and brewing.
            As the Korean incentive structure shifted, he responded
     by expanding into trading activities (after Liberation in 1945),
     import substitution industrialization (during the 1950s), and the
     export of manufactures (after 1961).  Following Liberation, he
     saw a lucrative market in international trade.  He established the
     Samsung Muslan Company in Seoul in 1948, and by 1950 his
     trading company's sales put him in the nation's top 10.
            With his substantial trading profits, Pyong-ch'ol
     established several import substitution activities, including Cheil
     Sugar Company in 1953 and Cheil Wool Textile, Ltd. in 1954.
     Cheil Wool purchased modern equipment from a West German
     firm and hired West German engineers to assemble the
     machinery and supervise start up.  Cheil Wool also sent five
     engineers to West Germany, England, and Australia for training.
     In the early 1960s, Cheil Wool was able to expand its spinning
     capacity by 50 percent without resorting to foreign technical
     assistance.  It also began to produce "top making" wool with
     additional West German technical assistance.  By 1969, the
     company became the first Korean textile firm to win an
     "invention award" from the Government.
            In addition to producing several of Korea's post-1960
     chaebol leaders, the period from 1910 to 1945 saw the
     emergence of smaller independent presidents/founders who
     became active exporters in the 1960s.   One such textile
     firm, founded in 1935, was sold after World War II by the
     Government to the Korean who managed it for the Japanese.
     This firm's continuous management history spans roughly 50
     years.  When export demand shifted to synthetics in the early
     1960s, the firm developed polyester cotton blends.  It was able
     to do this with Government subsidies and minimal technical
     assistance from a Japanese synthetic fiber manufacturer.  In
     1963, the company received the President's award for its
     contribution to poly/cotton blended fabrics.  Between 1963 and
     1971, the company's spindle/loom capacity was expanded six
     times. In all but one expansion episode, the company relied on
     British and Japanese engineering assistance.
            Although this historical sketch is not definitive, it does
     suggest considerable entrepreneurial skill and experience.
     Japanese language skills, education in Japanese universities and
     factories, and technical assistance from a broad array of
     machinery suppliers in Europe and Asia prior to 1960 portray
     a degree of technical competence and cosmopolitan outlook that
     bespeaks of an indigenous capacity to "fill the gap" in export
     services.
            Since most of Korea's post-1961 industrial expansion
     resulted from an increase in firm size rather than an increase in
     the number of firms (or entrepreneurs), it may well be that
     Korea made excellent use of the entrepreneurial talent that
     developed between 1910 and 1961 to expand exports.  This
     rather small number of entrepreneurs clearly knew how to
     export manufactures and were in touch with customer
     preferences in developed country markets.  They were well
     positioned to exploit the new economic opportunities for
     manufactured exports to developed country markets without
     much export services support from the public sector, as the
     post-1961 incentive system removed the bias against exports.
     This existing capability probably explains why the supply
     response of Korea's entrepreneurs to export incentives was so
     quick and so substantial.  It also suggests why the supply
     response might be lower elsewhere.
     4.  EXPORT SERVICES:  USE AND IMPACT
            Additional evidence on the roles played by the
     Government and the private sector in providing export services
     to exporters of manufactured goods is available from three
     interview studies of Korea's entrepreneurs.  Each of those
     studies, conducted in the mid-1970s, was designed to gather
     data on entrepreneurs' perception of the difficulty of the
     production and marketing problems they faced; identify the
     sources used by those entrepreneurs/exporters to acquire new
     technologies and break into new export markets; and provide
     limited insight into the role of government in assisting
     entrepreneurs/exporters to overcome their problems.  The author
     supplemented those surveys with selective in-depth interviews
     of public and private sector actors involved in the early export
     expansion.  What does this evidence suggest?
            How severe did Korean entrepreneurs perceive their
     production and marketing problems?  Entrepreneurs and
     exporters were asked to indicate the degree of difficulty they
     faced in (1) perceiving new market opportunities, (2) obtaining
     technicians and training, and (3) dealing with plant design,
     technology, and construction.  Respondents were asked to rate
     the difficulty of each task (on a scale ranging from 1 [very
     difficult] to 5 [simple]).  Responses were broken down between
     those who were exporters and those who produced for the
     domestic market.
            The absolute level of perceived difficulty among all
     entrepreneurs was quite low.  The modal response was
     generally "simple," while the mean response was between
     "simple" and "some problem," or between 3 and 5.  Responses
     reflected little difference in perception of level of difficulty
     between production for export and production for domestic use.
     Perhaps more surprising, exporters reported greater ease in
     perception of opportunity and market identification than
     entrepreneurs who produced for the domestic market.
            Where did Korean entrepreneurs turn for assistance
     when conceiving a new project or market, acquiring new
     technology, and finding relevant training?  Respondents stated
     that each of these tasks was overwhelmingly filled by the firm's
     chief executive and/or employees and relatives.  Foreign entities
     were cited as important in conceptualization (12.9 percent of the
     time); technology acquisition (18.7 percent of the time); and
     technical training (12.6 percent of the time).  Government was
     cited as important for financing (22.5 percent of the time) and
     conceptualization (6.5 percent of the time).  Government played
     a minimal role in technology acquisition (0.8 percent of the
     time) and technical training (0 percent of the time).
            Surprisingly, this distribution of entrepreneurial
     functions was roughly similar before and after 1968.  Even
     though the Government share in conceptualization of new
     opportunities/markets was almost four times larger before 1968
     than after 1968, Government assisted in project
     conceptualization only about a quarter of the time.
     Furthermore, a breakdown between exporters and nonexporters
     showed that foreign entities played a more important role than
     Government.
            How did Korean firms market their exports?  Marketing
     channels in the mid-1970s included the Korean Traders
     Association (KTA); more than 30 exporters' associations, such
     as the Korean Knitted Goods Exporters Association and the
     Korea Footwear Exporters Association; Japanese and Korean
     trading companies; importer/buyers; wholesalers/manufacturers
     in developed countries; government assistance through KOTRA;
     and an exporting firm's own overseas branch.
            What was the relative importance of these marketing
     channels and how did they change over time?  Unfortunately,
     there is no direct evidence on the relative importance of
     different marketing channels during the early stages of export
     expansion.  As early as 1969, Amicus Most, an A.I.D. technical
     adviser, stated that exporters were relying on large buyers in
     developed countries, Japanese and Korean trading companies,
     the KTA, the Korean Chamber of Commerce, KOTRA, and
     overseas branch offices of large Korean manufacturers.  But
     there was no mention of the relative importance of each
     channel.
            Data from one of the interview studies of exporters
     ranked the importance of marketing channels in the following
     order: importers (38.9 percent), wholesalers (14.6 percent),
     manufacturers (14.3 percent), exporting firm's own branch (11.3
     percent), Japanese trading company (9 percent), retail
     chain/department store (4.1 percent), and Korean trading
     company (3.7 percent).  When exporters were asked how
     first contact with buyers in new export markets were made, the
     most frequent responses were through foreign-buyers (40
     percent of the time) and visits to a foreign country (20 percent
     of the time).  Among the least frequent sources for initial
     contact were trade fairs and enquiries directed through
     KOTRA.
            These findings are consistent with the author's in-depth
     interviews of selected public and private sector individuals who
     had been actively involved in the early export drive.  Exporting
     through Japanese trading companies appears to have been
     significant in the early days, but those companies tightly limited
     Korean access to ultimate buyers and may have charged high
     margins.  Korean firms used a variety of strategies to expand
     their channels to foreign markets.  Industries, such as spinning
     and weaving, started their own export marketing organizations
     financed by levies on producers.  Others were able to track
     down their ultimate buyers to deal with them directly, or
     aggressively recruited large U.S. retail buyers.  Some relied
     on letters of introduction, others used "Jewish ragmen" from
     New York and the Middle East and Indian merchants, and
     others relied on overseas buyers who located in Korea for
     marketing and preshipment inspections.  Over time as
     exports expanded, the chaebols established their own overseas
     offices.  Ultimately, the Korean Government helped establish
     Korean trading companies, which have come to dominate the
     marketing of Korean exports.
            While some Korean industries relied on KOTRA's
     activities and overseas offices to find buyers, several reasons
     suggest that this approach was not important.  The complexity
     of styling and design issues for ready-made garments, for
     instance, was beyond KOTRA's capabilities.  Also, KOTRA
     had a limited understanding of the complexity of marketing
     channels.  As a result, neither buyers nor sellers of ready
     made garments used KOTRA to find each other.  Moreover,
     the experience of Japanese trading companies was of enormous
     advantage.  Japanese trading companies tended to know buyers'
     reputations, could easily get letters of credit, and were used to
     settling quality complaints.  KOTRA's role of finding buyers
     was also limited by the fact that plenty of buyers, especially big
     buyers, came to Korea on their own.
            This does not mean that KOTRA played no role in early
     export expansion.  Virtually everyone interviewed for this report
     stated that KOTRA's overseas offices were havens for Korean
     manufacturing visitors in the early days.  KOTRA's offices
     provided a "home abroad." They occasionally arranged contacts,
     provided access to cheaper international telephones and telexes,
     and  appears to have played an important research role.
            Where did Korean firms get production assistance and
     technology for modernization?  Because direct foreign
     investment was relatively small in Korea, multinational
     corporations did not fill the technology gap.  The
     contribution of technical assistance and licensing appears to be
     similarly small.  The cumulative value of technical assistance
     between 1962 and 1976 was less than $245 million, whereas the
     comparable figure for royalty payments to commercial sources
     for licensed technology was less than $115 million.
            If Korean entrepreneurs did not acquire most of their
     technology from direct foreign investment, technical assistance,
     or licensing, where did they get it?  Did government research
     institutes such as KIST play an important role?  Korea relied
     heavily on foreign loans to finance the import of foreign capital
     goods embodying new technology.  This was complemented
     by substantial local know-how, especially in basic process
     technology.  A survey of 112 exporting firms identified a rank
     ordering of important sources of basic process technology and
     product innovation technology.  In the rank ordering, 29.4
     percent responded that local know-how and experience acquired
     by personnel through previous domestic employment was
     important, followed by 19.7 percent for foreign
     suppliers/buyers, 16 percent for foreign licensing and technical
     assistance, and 13.2 percent for experience acquired by
     personnel through previous overseas employment.  Government
     institutions were cited as important sources less than 10 percent
     of the time.  For foreign and domestic sources taken jointly,
     suppliers/buyers were the most frequently cited sources (28.5
     percent) followed by the transfer of labor among firms (23.7
     percent).
            For product innovation technology (that is, for
     improvements in product quality, changes in product design,
     styling, and technical specifications) 68 percent cited that
     foreign sources were important.  Of foreign sources, buyers
     were cited most frequently (26.2 percent), followed by overseas
     travel by staff (19.9 percent).  Foreign buyers contributed to
     product innovation through periodic visits to production
     facilities, ongoing programs to improve quality, and by setting
     design, styling, packaging, and technical specifications.
            Our interviews and review of existing studies of and by
     KIST confirm that its technology development/transfer role was
     limited, especially in the early years of export expansion.  KIST
     was not established until after the export expansion was well
     under way, and its research effort mainly focused on import
     substitution industrialization.  Few of KIST's technology
     development or technology transfer projects were successfully
     commercialized.  More important, Korean firms relied
     heavily on the Japanese private sector for technology assistance.
     Virtually every exporter interviewed for this report stated
     receiving production assistance from the Japanese.  Reliance on
     the Japanese for technology is widely known in Korea.  The
     continued dependence on exports that use foreign buyer
     specifications in a significant number of export industries
     suggests that neither KIST nor the private sector has been able
     to free Korea from substantial reliance on imported
     technology.
            A closer examination of Korea's technology acquisition
     policies supports this interpretation.  Reliance on local know
     -how and previous employment experience are partly related to
     the past, as in the case of basic production technology for
     nonsynthetic textile yarn and plywood.  When queried about the
     sources of technology, exporters in these industries
     overwhelmingly indicated local sources, which is not
     particularly surprising since several of the leading textile
     exporters got their initial experience during the colonial period.
     This also appears to be the case for plywood manufacturers.
     The first plywood plant was established in 1935.  Subsequently,
     the industry benefited from the U.S. military's procurement
     programs of the 1950s.
            But some of Korea's technology acquisition appears to
     be related to the country's heavy investment in human capital
     and high-labor mobility among firms.  There are several
     distinctive features of Korea's educational and occupational
     structure that contributed to extensive local know-how in at
     least basic production technology.  When combined with the
     high degree of labor mobility among firms, Korean firms
     seemed to have possessed a substantial capacity to master basic
     process technology at an early stage in the export expansion.
            The Korean Government complemented this rich
     entrepreneurial heritage and substantial investment in human
     capital with the 1961 Foreign Capital Inducement Act (FCIA),
     which controlled the inflow of foreign loans, direct foreign
     investment, and foreign technology.  Under FCIA, all foreign
     investment proposals were required to specify the level and
     source of investment, the specific technology transferred, the
     methods of training and promotion of local personnel, the
     projected levels of output, the ratio of exports to output, and the
     ratio of domestic to foreign equity.
            Projects for which domestic technical knowledge was
     considered adequate were closed to foreign penetration, while
     those for which foreign technical assistance was sought were
     left open.  All foreign investors entering Korea were either
     required or encouraged to enter into a joint venture with a
     Korean firm.  Under these joint-venture agreements, the foreign
     partner was required to train the Korean partner's personnel.
     As a matter of practice, Korean firms in joint ventures
     frequently transferred those trained to other subsidiaries while
     rotating new personnel for training by the foreign partner.
     After Korean personnel learned the basic technology, the
     Government closed the sector to additional foreign investment.
            This particular combination of technology acquisition
     and assimilation involved falling back on basic production
     technology in labor intensive activities, such as textiles acquired
     before 1961; heavy investment in technical post-secondary
     education and high-labor mobility among firms; reliance on
     foreign suppliers/buyers for industry/commodity-specific
     product innovation technologies; and rigorous government
     control over the acquisition and diffusion of technology
     associated with foreign capital inflows.  This approach appears
     to have been a powerful mixture that propelled Korean
     industrialization and exports after 1961.  While it may be that
     government institutions such as KIST played some role in the
     acquisition and diffusion of technology, little evidence supports
     this.  Moreover, it would appear that the work of KIST as an
     export services institution was less significant in filling the
     technology gap than that of Korea's educational institutions,
     Korean firms, and the Foreign Capital Deliberation
     Committee.
            How important was the Government's export testing and
     inspection system?  Information on the Korean Government's
     export testing and inspection system is based on interviews of
     public and private sector individuals who were involved in the
     early export drive.  Several public sector individuals
     interviewed were convinced that the Government's intervention
     in export inspection was absolutely essential to Korea's export
     success, which was also, at least partially, corroborated by
     several private sector individuals.  But there is also evidence
     that importers/buyers did their own preshipment inspection and
     testing.  At least one large buyer went so far as to duplicate
     its own inspection and testing system for a prominent Korean
     chaebol.   Moreover, evidence suggests that the export
     testing and inspection was at times a vehicle for extortion by
     inspectors.
            How should these findings be interpreted?  The
     relatively low level of perceived production and marketing
     problems, the overwhelming reliance on Korean entrepreneurs
     and the foreign private sector to solve production and marketing
     problems, and the low level of attribution given government
     assistance could be consistent with one of two hypotheses.
     First, since the interviewees were successful exporters, they may
     have unwittingly biased responses by overestimating their own
     roles and crediting government assistance less.  Alternatively,
     the existence of numerous private quality control institutions;
     the servicing of export markets by Japanese trading companies,
     importers/buyers, and foreign machinery suppliers; and a
     substantial pre-1961 manufacturing and manufacturing export
     -based entrepreneurial history suggest that the indigenous and
     international private sectors had the capacity to meet the export
     services' needs of Korea's manufacturing exporters.  Although
     interview bias cannot be ruled out, the preponderance of
     evidence suggests that Government export services had a
     minimal impact on export expansion.
            5.  IMPLICATIONS FOR DONORS
            This paper has emphasized that the Government's
     export services assistance should be viewed in light of (1) the
     Government's highly statist export drive and (2) the capacity of
     the indigenous private sector and the international private sector
     to meet production and marketing needs of manufacturing
     exporters.  Since lucrative export incentives were conditioned
     on firms meeting export performance targets, the Government's
     export services support might have been highly effective if it
     had helped firms overcome marketing or production bottlenecks
     to meet targets.  But this proved not to be the case.  The
     Korean Government and A.I.D. seriously underestimated the
     capacity of Korean entrepreneurs and their foreign associates to
     meet the export services needs of exporters of manufactures.
     Moreover, they chose an inappropriate delivery vehicle (public
     sector institutions) to implement this support.  What then can
     donors learn from this experience?
            Be careful in identifying the rationale for intervention
     in export services markets.  Test that rationale against reality
     before intervening.  The statist orientation of export promotion
     and distrust of the private sector led the Government to assume
     market failure in the export services markets.  This assumption
     proved wrong.  Both the Government and A.I.D. underestimated
     the industrial and export experience of Koreans during the
     period of Japanese colonialism.  The capacity of Korean
     entrepreneurs to respond to shifts in the incentive structure was
     assumed to be limited, and the technical, managerial, and
     foreign trade skills of the Korean workforce were considered to
     be woefully inadequate.  The pre-1961 history of
     substantial technical assistance in production, especially in
     textiles, from Japan, Germany, Britain, and Australia was all but
     ignored.  The role of Japanese trading companies, and
     importer/buyers from Japan and the United States in export
     marketing was often overlooked.  If the Government and A.I.D.
     had undertaken a serious assessment of the private sector's
     capacity, including the foreign private sector, to meet the
     production and marketing needs of new manufacturing exporters
     before providing public sector export services assistance, one
     wonders whether they would have invested so heavily in export
     services assistance or whether their assistance strategy would
     have focused as much on the public sector.
            It may be difficult to make public sector provision of
     export services effective.  Korea's lucrative export incentive
     system provides an ideal opportunity to test the effectiveness of
     the strategy of a public sector provision of export services.  If
     the Government's export services support had helped firms
     overcome marketing or production problems that had kept them
     from meeting or exceeding targets, the effort would have
     demonstrated how publicly provided export services offered in
     tandem with the right incentive structure could propel export
     growth.  But the effort failed because the Government chose an
     inappropriate services delivery strategy while seriously
     underestimating the capacity of Korean entrepreneurs and the
     international private sector to meet the export services needs of
     exporters of manufactures.  It is important to understand why
     public sector provision did not work in Korea, so that it will be
     possible to consider conditions under the public sector may be
     of assistance.
            Export services provided by the international private
     sector do make a difference.  Until exporters established their
     own overseas offices or came to depend on Korean trading
     companies, they relied heavily on marketing assistance from
     Japanese trading companies and importers/buyers; some
     exporters continue to rely on Japanese trading companies.  They
     also relied heavily on foreign machinery suppliers for
     production innovation assistance.  Basic process technology was
     provided through local know-how, foreign suppliers/buyers, and
     experience acquired by personnel in overseas employment.
     Quality control assistance also came from international sources.
     Each of these services was highly valued by exporters.  Given
     the extensive production and marketing contacts that developed
     between Korean exporters and a panoply of foreign export
     services providers, it is difficult to believe that those services
     did not have a significant impact on export expansion.  This
     suggests that effective production and marketing assistance to
     nascent exporters should focus on helping exporters develop
     long-term collaborative relationships with developed-country
     importers/buyers, manufacturers, and foreign machinery
     suppliers.
            If a need for publicly supported export services is
     demonstrated, the services should either be supported without
     creating public sector institutions or those institutions should be
     subject to sunset provisions.  Each of the public sector export
     services institutions examined have undergone substantial
     sustainability crises, reflected in loss of initial mission, sagging
     morale, and the search for new roles.  As the Korean private
     sector's overseas marketing experience increased, KOTRA was
     forced to create new roles for itself.  During the 1970s, it
     developed a capacity to research loopholes in protectionist
     legislation in the West.  In the early 1980s, it worked on
     expanding U.S. exports to Korea by holding a production show
     for American companies in Seoul.  More recently, it has taken
     an active role in expanding exports of Korean brand-name,
     higher value-added exports.  It has also begun training
     personnel from other developing country export promotion
     organizations.  In 1989 a new president sought and obtained an
     independent financial base and new mission.  While this
     seems to have lifted sagging morale, it is not clear that KOTRA
     has a remaining raison d'etre.
            Sustainability problems have also confronted KIST,
     which has had difficulty funding itself through private sector
     contract research.  Through the mid-1970s, 80 percent of
     KIST's funding came from the private sector.  By the mid
     -1980s, despite the fact that the private sector was funding about
     80 percent of all research and development, more than 65
     percent of KIST's funding came from Government.  The
     difficulty of creating and sustaining a single public sector
     applied industrial technology organization to serve all of
     Korea's industry has also undermined KIST's institutional
     stability.  The widely differing technology needs of Korea's
     different industries led to the spin-off of 16 separate
     government research institutes from KIST during the 1970s.
     These institutes were integrated into nine major institutions in
     1981. The reorganization saw the merger of KIST with the
     Korean Advanced Institute of Science (KAIS) to create the
     Korean Advanced Institute of Science and Technology
     (KAIST).  But in 1989, KIST was split off from KAIST.
            The six private sector export inspection and testing
     institutes established by the Government have experienced
     similar fates.  Initially all exporters were required to obtain
     export inspection certificates from one of the six government
     institutes.  But revisions of the Export Inspection Act granted
     exemptions when (1) a letter of credit or an export contract
     required that goods be inspected by the buyer or (2) an exporter
     gained permission from the IA.  Moreover, automatic
     exemptions are provided for all products accorded the KS mark
     or any foreign industrial standards mark recognized by the
     IA.  As a result, export inspection fees of the testing
     institutes have fallen and they have been forced to develop
     other lines of business.
            Whereas at least one of the private export inspection
     and testing institutes appears to have found a productive role,
     it is not clear that any of the public sector institutions have a
     raison d'etre.  If Korea had provided limited and time-bound
     public support to private sector export services providers, it
     could have avoided creating and sustaining several ineffective
     public institutions.  Because it is difficult to reform or close an
     institution after it has been created, the decision to adopt a
     strategy of public provision of export services should not be
     taken lightly.
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